2-4-2 / Type systems Polymorphism

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- Why polymorphism?
- Polymorphic λ-calculus
- Damas and Milner's type system
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What is polymorphism?

Polymorphism is the ability for a term to *simultaneously* admit several distinct types.

Why polymorphism?

Polymorphism is *indispensable* [Reynolds, 1974]: if a function that sorts a list is independent of the type of the list elements, then it should be directly applicable to lists of integers, lists of Booleans, etc. In short, it should have polymorphic type:

$$\forall X.(X \to X \to bool) \to \text{list } X \to \text{list } X$$

which instantiates to the monomorphic types:

$$(int \rightarrow int \rightarrow bool) \rightarrow list int \rightarrow list int$$

 $(bool \rightarrow bool \rightarrow bool) \rightarrow list bool \rightarrow list bool$
...

In the absence of polymorphism, the only ways of achieving this effect would be:

- to manually duplicate the list sorting function at every type (no-no!);
- to use subtyping and claim that the function sorts lists of values of any type:

$$(\top \rightarrow \top \rightarrow bool) \rightarrow list \top \rightarrow list \top$$

(The type T is the type of all values, and the supertype of all types.) This leads to loss of information and subsequently requires introducing an unsafe downcast operation. This is the approach followed in Java before generics were introduced in 1.5.

Polymorphism is already implicitly present in simply-typed λ -calculus. Indeed, we have checked (in fact, inferred) that the type:

$$(X_1 \to X_2) \to X_1 \to X_1 \to X_2 \times X_2$$

is a principal type for the term $\lambda fxy.(fx, fy)$.

It seems that it would not be much different to write that this term admits the polymorphic type:

$$\forall X_1 X_2 . (X_1 \to X_2) \to X_1 \to X_1 \to X_2 \times X_2$$

Polymorphism is a step on the road towards type abstraction. Intuitively, if a function that sorts a list has polymorphic type:

$$\forall X.(X \to X \to bool) \to \text{list } X \to \text{list } X$$

then it knows nothing about X — it is parametric in X — so it must manipulate the list elements abstractly: it can copy them around, pass them as arguments to the comparison function, but it cannot directly inspect their structure.

In short, within the code of the list sorting function, the variable X is an *abstract type*.

In the presence of polymorphism (and in the absence of effects), a type can reveal a lot of information about the terms that inhabit it. For instance, the polymorphic type

$\forall X.X \longrightarrow X$

has only one inhabitant, namely the identity. Similarly, the type of the list sorting function reveals a *"free theorem"* about its behavior!

This phenomenon was studied by Reynolds [1983] and by Wadler [1989, 2007], among others. An account based on an operational semantics is offered by Pitts [2000].

Let me begin a short digression.

The term "polymorphism" dates back to a 1967 paper by Strachey [2000], where *ad hoc polymorphism* and *parametric polymorphism* were distinguished.

 ${\sf I}$ see two different (and sometimes incompatible) ways of defining this distinction...

Here is one definition of the distinction:

With parametric polymorphism, a term can admit several types, all of which are *instances* of a single polymorphic type:

 $int \to int, bool \to bool, \dots$ $\forall X. X \to X$

With ad hoc polymorphism, a term can admit a collection of *unrelated* types:

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{int} \to \text{int}, \text{float} \to \text{float} \to \text{float}, \dots \\ & but \ not \ \forall X. X \to X \to X \end{array}$$

Here is another definition:

With parametric polymorphism, untyped programs have a well-defined semantics. (Think of the identity function.) Types are used only to rule out unsafe programs.

With ad hoc polymorphism, untyped programs do not have a semantics: *the meaning of a term can depend upon its type*. (Think of an overloaded addition function.)

By the first definition, Haskell's type classes [Hudak et al., 2007] are a form of (bounded) parametric polymorphism: terms have principal (qualified) type schemes, such as:

 $\forall X. \mathsf{Num} \ X \Longrightarrow X \longrightarrow X \longrightarrow X$

Yet, by the second definition, type classes are a form of ad hoc polymorphism: untyped programs do not have a semantics.

End of digression — in this course, we are interested only in the simplest form of parametric polymorphism.

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The polymorphic λ -calculus (also known as: the second-order λ -calculus; F_2 ; System F) was independently defined by Girard (1972) and Reynolds [1974].

Compared to the simply-typed λ -calculus, types are extended:

 $T ::= \dots | \forall X.T$

How are terms are extended? There are two variants, which respectively yield *explicit* and *implicit* forms of polymorphism...

Explicit polymorphic A-calculus

In the explicit variant [Reynolds, 1974], there are term-level constructs for introducing and eliminating the universal quantifier:

TAbs	ТАрр
$\Gamma; X \vdash t : T$	$\Gamma \vdash t : \forall X.T$
$\overline{\Gamma \vdash \Lambda X.t : \forall X.T}$	$\overline{\Gamma \vdash t \ T' : [X \mapsto T']T}$

Type variables are explicitly bound and appear in type environments. The operational semantics is extended accordingly:

$$t ::= \dots | \land X.t | t T$$
$$v ::= \dots | \land X.t$$
$$E ::= \dots | [] T$$
$$(\land X.t) T \longrightarrow [X \mapsto T]t$$

This variant has several disadvantages.

Because it alters the semantics, it does not fit our view that the untyped semantics should pre-exist and that a type system is only a predicate that selects a subset of the well-behaved terms.

Because it does not allow evaluation under Λ -abstractions, it effectively imposes the restriction that only functions can be polymorphic. This is unnecessary and undesirable — think, for instance, of the empty list.

In summary, an *implicit* variant, which does not alter the syntax and semantics of untyped terms, and (as a consequence) allows evaluation under a universal introduction rule, would be *more general*.

The syntax and semantics of terms are unchanged.

The typing rules that introduce and eliminate the universal quantifier are non-syntax-directed:

∀-Intro		∀-Elim
$\Gamma \vdash t : T$	Х # Г	$\Gamma \vdash t : \forall X.T$
$\Gamma \vdash t : \forall X.T$		$\overline{\Gamma \vdash t : [X \mapsto T']T}$

Because this implicit variant of System F allows evaluation under a universal introduction rule, it exhibits an interaction with references, while the explicit variant does not. (Details later today.)

Type variables are not explicitly introduced.

Why the side condition $X \# \Gamma$?...

On the side condition $X \ \# \ \Gamma$

Omitting the side condition leads to unsoundness:

 $x: X_1 \vdash x: X_1$

Broken \forall -Intro $\frac{x: X_1 \vdash x: X_1}{x: X_1 \vdash x: \forall X_1.X_1}$

Broken
$$\forall$$
-Intro
 \forall -Elim $\frac{x: X_1 \vdash x: X_1}{x: X_1 \vdash x: \forall X_1.X_1}$
 $x: X_1 \vdash x: X_2$

Broken
$$\forall$$
-Intro
 \forall -Elim
Abs
$$\frac{x: X_1 \vdash x: X_1}{x: X_1 \vdash x: \forall X_1.X_1}$$
$$\frac{x: X_1 \vdash x: X_2}{\varphi \vdash \lambda x. x: X_1 \rightarrow X_2}$$

Broken
$$\forall$$
-Intro
 \forall -Elim
 \forall -Elim
 $\frac{X: X_1 \vdash X: X_1}{X: X_1 \vdash X: \forall X_1.X_1}$
 $\frac{Abs}{0 \vdash \lambda x. x: X_1 \rightarrow X_2}$
 \forall -Intro²
 $\frac{\varphi \vdash \lambda x. x: \forall X_1.\forall X_2.X_1 \rightarrow X_2}{\varphi \vdash \lambda x. x: \forall X_1.\forall X_2.X_1 \rightarrow X_2}$

This is a type derivation for a type cast (Objective Caml's Obj.magic).

A good intuition is: a judgement $\Gamma \vdash t : T$ corresponds to the logical assertion $\forall \bar{X}.(\Gamma \Rightarrow T)$, where \bar{X} are the free type variables of the judgement.

In that view, \forall -Intro corresponds to the axiom:

 $\forall X.(P \Rightarrow Q) \equiv P \Rightarrow (\forall X.Q) \quad \text{if } X \# P$

Quiz: why is there no such side condition in the explicit variant of System F? Or is there one, and where?

Quiz: why is there no such side condition in the explicit variant of System F? Or is there one, and where?

Answer: no such condition is needed in rule TAbs, because (1) in the premise of TAbs, the environment is extended with an explicit binding of X, and (2) the definition of environment lookup, not shown earlier, contains a side condition:

$$(\Gamma; X)(x) = \Gamma(x)$$
 if $X \# \Gamma(x)$

The details vary, but the side condition exists in both variants.

Here is a version of the term $\lambda f_{xy}(f_x, f_y)$ that carries explicit type abstractions and annotations:

 $\Lambda X_1.\Lambda X_2.\lambda f: X_1 \to X_2.\lambda x: X_1.\lambda y: X_1.(f x, f y)$

This term admits the polymorphic type:

$$\forall X_1.\forall X_2.(X_1 \to X_2) \to X_1 \to X_1 \to X_2 \times X_2$$

Quite unsurprising, right?

Perhaps more surprising is the fact that this untyped term can be decorated in a different way:

 $\wedge X_1 . \wedge X_2 . \lambda f : \forall X. X \longrightarrow X . \lambda x : X_1 . \lambda y : X_2 . (f X_1 x, f X_2 y)$

This term admits the polymorphic type:

$$\forall X_1.\forall X_2.(\forall X.X \to X) \to X_1 \to X_2 \to X_1 \times X_2$$

This begs the question: ...

System F does not have principal types

Which of the two is more general?

$$\begin{array}{l} \forall X_1.\forall X_2.(X_1 \rightarrow X_2) \rightarrow X_1 \rightarrow X_1 \rightarrow X_2 \times X_2 \\ \forall X_1.\forall X_2.(\forall X.X \rightarrow X) \rightarrow X_1 \rightarrow X_2 \rightarrow X_1 \times X_2 \end{array}$$

Which of the two is more general?

$$\begin{array}{c} \forall X_1.\forall X_2.(X_1 \rightarrow X_2) \rightarrow X_1 \rightarrow X_1 \rightarrow X_2 \times X_2 \\ \forall X_1.\forall X_2.(\forall X.X \rightarrow X) \rightarrow X_1 \rightarrow X_2 \rightarrow X_1 \times X_2 \end{array}$$

One requires x and y to admit a common type, while the other requires f to be polymorphic. *Neither is an instance of the other!* In System F, "to be an instance" is defined by the rule:

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{InstGen} \\ \hline \bar{Y} \ \# \ \forall \bar{X}.T \\ \hline \\ \overline{\forall \bar{X}.T \ \leq \forall \bar{Y}.[\vec{X} \mapsto \vec{T}]T} \end{array} \end{array}$$

Furthermore, (I believe) one can show that the untyped term $\lambda fxy.(f x, f y)$ does not admit a type of which both of these types are instances.

System F does not have principal types!

Mitchell [1988] defines System F_{η} , a version of System F extended with a richer subtyping (or instance) relation:

(System F_{η} can also be defined as the closure of System F under η -equality.)

Because System F_{η} has a richer instance relation, there was some hope that it could have principal types. This turned out *not* to be the case.

Furthermore, Mitchell's subtyping relation was shown to be undecidable [Wells, 1995].

Finally, it was shown that type inference for both System F and System F_{η} is undecidable as well [Wells, 1999].

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Damas and Milner's type system [Milner, 1978] offers a restricted form of polymorphism, while avoiding the difficulties associated with type inference in System *F*.

This type system is at the heart of Standard ML, Objective Caml, and Haskell.

The type inference algorithm should be a simple extension of the algorithm that was developed for simply-typed λ -calculus.

To this end, it should exploit polymorphism where obviously *available*, but should not try to guess where polymorphism is *necessary*.

In other words, it should continue to rely on first-order unification: that is, type variables should continue to stand for types without quantifiers.

Some intuitions

For instance, this term should be well-typed:

let $f = \lambda z.z$ in (f O, f true)

Indeed, f is known to be bound to $\lambda z.z$, a term whose principal type $(\forall X.X \rightarrow X)$ can be inferred as in simply-typed λ -calculus.

On the other hand, this term should be ill-typed:

 $\lambda f.(f O, f true)$

Indeed, no monotype is suitable for f, and we deliberately refuse to let a type variable stand for an unknown polymorphic type.

In short, *let-bound* variables receive possibly polymorphic types, while λ -bound variables must receive monomorphic types.

There is a simple intuition behind Damas and Milner's type system: a closed term has type T if and only if its *let-normal form* has type T in simply-typed λ -calculus.

A term's let-normal form is obtained by iterating the rewrite rule:

let
$$x = t_1$$
 in $t_2 \rightarrow t_1; [x \mapsto t_1]t_2$

This intuition suggests type-checking and type inference algorithms. But these algorithms are *not practical*, because:

- they have exponential complexity;
- separate compilation blocks reduction to let-normal form.

In the following, we study a direct presentation of Damas and Milner's type system, which does not involve let-normal forms.

It is *practical*, because:

- it leads to an efficient type inference algorithm;
- it supports separate compilation.

Terms are now given by:

$$t ::= x \mid \lambda x.t \mid t t \mid \text{let } x = t \text{ in } t \mid \dots$$

The let construct is no longer sugar for a β -redex: it is now a primitive form.

The syntax of types is unchanged with respect to simply-typed λ -calculus:

$$T ::= X \mid T \to T \mid \dots$$

A separate category of type schemes is introduced:

These correspond to the principal type schemes of simply-typed λ -calculus. All quantifiers must appear in *prenex position*, so type schemes are less expressive than System F types.

A type environment Γ is now a finite sequence of bindings of variables to type schemes.

Judgements now take the form:

「⊢t:S

Types form a subset of type schemes, so type environments and judgements can contain types too.

Typing rules


Here is a standard, non-syntax-directed presentation.

Var	Abs	Арр	
$\Gamma(x) = \mathbf{S}$	$\Gamma; x: T \vdash t: T'$	$\Gamma \vdash t_1 : T -$	$T' \Gamma \vdash t_2 : T$
Г	$\overline{\Gamma \vdash \lambda \mathbf{x}.t: T \to T'}$	$\Gamma \vdash t_1 t_2 : T'$	
		Gen	
Let		$\Gamma \vdash t : T$	Inst
$\Gamma \vdash t_1 : S$	Г;x: <mark>S</mark> ⊢t ₂ :T	<i>Χ</i> # Γ	$\Gamma \vdash t : \forall \bar{X}.T$
$\Gamma \vdash \text{let } x = t_1 \text{ in } t_2 : T$		$\overline{\Gamma \vdash t : \forall \overline{X}.T}$	$\overline{\Gamma \vdash t : [\vec{X} \mapsto \vec{T}]T}$

Let moves a type scheme into the environment, which Var can exploit. Abs and App are unchanged. λ -bound variables receive a monotype. Gen and lnst are as in implicit System F, except they introduce or eliminate multiple universal quantifiers at once. Type variables are instantiated with monotypes.

Example

Here is a simple type derivation that exploits polymorphism:



(Γ stands for $f: \forall X.X \rightarrow X.$)

Gen is used above Let (at left), and Inst is used below Var. In fact, every type derivation can be put in this form. (*forward)

As announced, this term is ill-typed:

 $\lambda f.(f O, f true)$

Indeed, this term contains no "let" construct, so it is type-checked exactly as in simply-typed λ -calculus, where it is ill-typed, because the equation:

$$\mathsf{int} \to T_1 = \mathsf{bool} \to T_2$$

has no solution.

Recall that this term is well-typed in implicit System F.

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Type soundness for Damas and Milner's type system is proved using the standard syntactic method [Wright and Felleisen, 1994].

Before reviewing the Subject Reduction proof, we need two stepping stones:

- a Type Substitution lemma;
- a syntax-directed presentation of the type system.

Definition

A renaming ρ is a total, bijective mapping of type variables to type variables whose domain is finite. The *domain* of ρ is the set of the type variables X such that $\rho(X) \neq X$. The support of ρ is its domain.

Renamings apply to types, type schemes, and type environments:

$$\begin{split} \rho(T_1 \to T_2) &= \rho(T_1) \to \rho(T_2) \\ \rho(\forall \bar{X}.T) &= \forall \rho(\bar{X}).\rho(T) \\ \rho(\emptyset) &= \emptyset \\ \rho(\Gamma; x:S) &= \rho(\Gamma); x: \rho(S) \end{split}$$

The skeleton of a type derivation is its underlying rule name tree. Two derivations are *isomorphic* when they have the same skeleton.

Lemma (Renaming)

For every derivation of $\Gamma \vdash t : S$, there exists an isomorphic derivation of $\rho(\Gamma) \vdash t : \rho(S)$.

Proof.

No typing rule is sensitive to the choice of type variable names.

Definition

A substitution φ is a total mapping of type variables to types whose domain is finite. The domain of φ is the set of the type variables X such that $\varphi(X) \neq X$. The codomain of φ is the set of the type variables that appear free in the image of its domain. The support of φ is the union of its domain and codomain. X # φ holds if and only if X is not in the support of φ .

Substitutions apply to types, type schemes, and type environments:

$$\begin{split} \varphi(T_1 \to T_2) &= \varphi(T_1) \to \varphi(T_2) \\ \varphi(\forall \bar{X}.T) &= \forall \bar{X}.\varphi(T) & \text{if } \bar{X} \ \# \ \varphi \\ \varphi(\emptyset) &= \emptyset \\ \varphi(\Gamma; x:S) &= \varphi(\Gamma); x:\varphi(S) \end{split}$$

Lemma (Type substitution)

For every derivation of $\Gamma \vdash t : S$, there exists an isomorphic derivation of $\varphi(\Gamma) \vdash t : \varphi(S)$.

Proof.

By structural induction over derivations. Only two cases are of interest, namely Gen and Inst. See next slides...

Type substitution: Gen

The hypothesis is:

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t: T \qquad \bar{X} \# \Gamma}{\Gamma \vdash t: \forall \bar{X}. T}$$

The goal is:

$$\varphi(\Gamma) \vdash t : \varphi(\forall \bar{X}.T)$$

How to proceed? (Hint: what do we know about $\varphi(\forall \bar{X}.T)$?)

Type substitution: Gen

We distinguish two cases:

• first, the ideal case where $\bar{X} \# \varphi$ holds; there, the goal becomes:

$$\varphi(\Gamma) \vdash t : \forall \bar{X}. \varphi(T)$$

• then, the general case.

Invoking the induction hypothesis yields $\varphi(\Gamma) \vdash t : \varphi(T)$.

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The freshness hypothesis $\bar{X} \# \varphi$, together with the premise $\bar{X} \# \Gamma$, imply $\bar{X} \# \varphi(\Gamma)$ (lemma – exercise!).

Invoking the induction hypothesis yields $\varphi(\Gamma) \vdash t : \varphi(T)$.

The freshness hypothesis $\bar{X} \# \varphi$, together with the premise $\bar{X} \# \Gamma$, imply $\bar{X} \# \varphi(\Gamma)$ (lemma – exercise!).

We now build a new instance of Gen:

$$\frac{\varphi(\Gamma) \vdash t : \varphi(T) \qquad \bar{X} \# \varphi(\Gamma)}{\varphi(\Gamma) \vdash t : \forall \bar{X}. \varphi(T)}$$

This is the goal.

What if $\bar{X} \# \varphi$ does not hold? Recall that the hypothesis is:

 $\frac{\Gamma \vdash t: T \qquad \bar{X} \# \Gamma}{\Gamma \vdash t: \forall \bar{X}.T}$

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This is where the premise $\bar{X} \# \Gamma$ plays a role.

What if $\bar{X} # \varphi$ does not hold? Recall that the hypothesis is:

 $\frac{\Gamma \vdash t: T \qquad \bar{X} \# \Gamma}{\Gamma \vdash t: \forall \bar{X}.T}$

This is where the premise $\bar{X} \# \Gamma$ plays a role.

Because \bar{X} does not appear free in the conclusion, it can be renamed in the premises (via the renaming lemma) without affecting the conclusion.

We are then back to the ideal case, with a different choice of \bar{X} .

Type substitution: Inst

The hypothesis is:

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t : \forall \bar{X}.T}{\Gamma \vdash t : [\vec{X} \mapsto \vec{T}]T}$$

The goal is:

$$\varphi(\Gamma) \vdash t : \varphi([\vec{X} \mapsto \vec{T}]T)$$

How to proceed?

We again begin with the ideal case where $\bar{X} \# \varphi$ holds.

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By the induction hypothesis, we have:

 $\varphi(\Gamma) \vdash t : \varphi(\forall \bar{X}.T)$

We again begin with the ideal case where $\bar{X} \# \varphi$ holds. By the induction hypothesis, we have:

 $\varphi(\Gamma) \vdash t : \varphi(\forall \bar{X}.T)$

which, by the freshness hypothesis, can be written:

 $\varphi(\Gamma) \vdash t : \forall \bar{X}. \varphi(T)$

We again begin with the ideal case where $\bar{X} \# \varphi$ holds. By the induction hypothesis, we have:

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which, by the freshness hypothesis, can be written:

 $\varphi(\Gamma) \vdash t : \forall \bar{X}. \varphi(T)$

We now build a new instance of Inst:

$$\frac{\varphi(\Gamma) \vdash t : \forall \bar{X}.\varphi(T)}{\varphi(\Gamma) \vdash t : [\bar{X} \mapsto \varphi(\vec{T})]\varphi(T)}$$

Is this the goal $\varphi(\Gamma) \vdash t : \varphi([\vec{X} \mapsto \vec{T}]T)$?

There remains to check that the substitutions $\varphi_1 = \varphi \circ [\vec{X} \mapsto \vec{T}]$ and $\varphi_2 = [\vec{X} \mapsto \varphi(\vec{T})] \circ \varphi$ coincide.

This is done by applying both substitutions to an arbitrary variable X. We distinguish two sub-cases: $X \in \overline{X}$ and $X \notin \overline{X}$.

Type substitution: Inst / ideal case / sub-case $X \in \bar{X}$

Recall
$$\varphi_1 = \varphi \circ [\vec{X} \mapsto \vec{T}]$$
 and $\varphi_2 = [\vec{X} \mapsto \varphi(\vec{T})] \circ \varphi$.

Recall
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For some index i, X is X_i, the *i*-th element of the vector \vec{X} . Then, $\varphi_1(X)$ is $\varphi(T_i)$, where T_i is the *i*-th element of the vector \vec{T} .

Recall
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For some index i, X is X_i , the *i*-th element of the vector \vec{X} . Then, $\varphi_1(X)$ is $\varphi(T_i)$, where T_i is the *i*-th element of the vector \vec{T} .

 $X \in \overline{X}$ and $\overline{X} \# \varphi$ imply $X \# \varphi$, so X is not in the domain of φ , so $\varphi(X)$ is X. There follows that $\varphi_2(X)$ is also $\varphi(T_i)$.

Type substitution: Inst / ideal case / sub-case $X \notin \overline{X}$

Recall
$$\varphi_1 = \varphi \circ [\vec{X} \mapsto \vec{T}]$$
 and $\varphi_2 = [\vec{X} \mapsto \varphi(\vec{T})] \circ \varphi$.

Type substitution: Inst / ideal case / sub-case $X \notin \overline{X}$

Recall
$$\varphi_1 = \varphi \circ [\vec{X} \mapsto \vec{T}]$$
 and $\varphi_2 = [\vec{X} \mapsto \varphi(\vec{T})] \circ \varphi$.
Then, $\varphi_1(X)$ is $\varphi(X)$.

Recall
$$\varphi_1 = \varphi \circ [\vec{X} \mapsto \vec{T}]$$
 and $\varphi_2 = [\vec{X} \mapsto \varphi(\vec{T})] \circ \varphi$.
Then, $\varphi_1(X)$ is $\varphi(X)$.
 $\bar{X} \# \varphi$ and $\bar{X} \# X$ imply $\bar{X} \# \varphi(X)$, which implies that $\varphi_2(X)$ is $\varphi(X)$.

 \rightarrow

What if $\bar{X} \# \varphi$ does not hold? Recall that the hypothesis is:

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t : \forall \bar{X}.T}{\Gamma \vdash t : [\vec{X} \mapsto \vec{T}]T}$$

What if $\bar{X} # \varphi$ does not hold? Recall that the hypothesis is:

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t : \forall \bar{X}.T}{\Gamma \vdash t : [\vec{X} \mapsto \vec{T}]T}$$

Because \bar{X} is mute in the premise (where it is bound) and in the conclusion (where it is substituted out), it can be renamed without affecting either of them.

We are then back to the ideal case, with a different choice of \bar{X} .

Reasoning up to alpha-conversion

What if you don't believe me ??

Isn't there too much handwaving in these alpha-conversion arguments? *True.* It would be easy to get one of them wrong.

Confidence can be increased via mechanized proof-checking.

However, how to understand name binding, and how to deal with it in a logic or a proof assistant, is still partly an open issue.

For theoretical bases, see Gabbay and Pitts [2002] and Pitts [2006]. There is also work within proof assistants, e.g. Coq [Aydemir et al., 2008], Isabelle/HOL [Urban and Tasson, 2005], Twelf [Harper and Licata, 2007, Pientka, 2007]. An instance of Gen followed with an instance of Inst annihilate. Lemma (Annihilation)

If $\Gamma \vdash t: S$ admits a derivation with skeleton $\Delta/Gen/Inst$, then it admits a derivation with skeleton Δ .

Proof.

By the Type Substitution lemma (see next slides)...

Annihilation

Up to a renaming of Gen's premise, the hypothesis is:

$$Gen \frac{\Gamma \vdash t: T \qquad \bar{X} \# \Gamma}{\Gamma \vdash t: \forall \bar{X}.T}$$
Inst $\overline{\Gamma \vdash t: [\vec{X} \mapsto \vec{T}]T}$

where the derivation of $\Gamma \vdash t : T$ has skeleton Δ .

Annihilation

Up to a renaming of Gen's premise, the hypothesis is:

$$Gen \frac{\Gamma \vdash t: T \qquad \bar{X} \# \Gamma}{\Gamma \vdash t: \forall \bar{X}.T}$$
Inst $\overline{\Gamma \vdash t: [\vec{X} \mapsto \vec{T}]T}$

where the derivation of $\Gamma \vdash t: T$ has skeleton Δ .

By the Type Substitution lemma, there is a derivation of:

$$[\vec{X} \mapsto \vec{T}] \Gamma \vdash t : [\vec{X} \mapsto \vec{T}] T$$

with skeleton Δ .

Annihilation

Up to a renaming of Gen's premise, the hypothesis is:

$$Gen \frac{\Gamma \vdash t: T \qquad \bar{X} \# \Gamma}{\Gamma \vdash t: \forall \bar{X}.T}$$
Inst $\overline{\Gamma \vdash t: [\vec{X} \mapsto \vec{T}]T}$

where the derivation of $\Gamma \vdash t : T$ has skeleton Δ .

By the Type Substitution lemma, there is a derivation of:

$$[\vec{X} \mapsto \vec{T}] \Gamma \vdash t : [\vec{X} \mapsto \vec{T}] T$$

with skeleton Δ .

Because $\bar{X} \# \Gamma$, this is exactly:

$$\Gamma \vdash t : [\vec{X} \mapsto \vec{T}]T$$

In Damas and Milner's type system, \checkmark a non-trivial instance of Gen cannot appear above Abs, App, Let (at right), or Gen. It can appear above Let (at left) or Inst.

A non-trivial instance of Inst cannot appear below Abs, App, Let, or Inst. It *can* appear below Var or Gen.

The Annihilation lemma implies that disallowing Gen above Inst removes no expressive power.

In summary, Gen is useful only above Let (at left), or possibly at the root of the derivation; and Inst is useful only below Var.

This leads to an alternative formulation of the type system...

Typing rules

Here is the standard, syntax-directed presentation of Damas and Milner's type system.

$\begin{array}{l} \text{VarInst} \\ \Gamma(x) = \forall \bar{X}. \mathcal{T} \end{array}$	Аbs Г;х:Т⊣t:Т′
$\Gamma \vdash x : [\vec{X} \mapsto \vec{T}]T$	$\Gamma \vdash \lambda \mathbf{x}.t: T \to T'$
Арр	$\begin{array}{c} GenLet\\ \Gamma \vdash t_1: T_1 \qquad \bar{X} \ \# \ \Gamma \end{array}$
$\Gamma \vdash t_1 : T \to T' \qquad \Gamma \vdash t_2 : T$	$\Gamma; x: \forall \bar{X}.T_1 \vdash t_2: T_2$
$\Gamma \vdash t_1 \ t_2 : T'$	$\Gamma \vdash \text{let } x = t_1 \text{ in } t_2 : T_2$

Judgements are now of the form $\Gamma \vdash t:T$.

The two presentations are equivalent:

Lemma (Equivalence)

Let $\bar{X} \# \Gamma$. The non-syntax-directed presentation derives $\Gamma \vdash t : \forall \bar{X}.T$ if and only if the syntax-directed presentation derives $\Gamma \vdash t : T$.

This is good to know in itself.

Furthermore, this means that, in the subject reduction proof that follows, we can *deconstruct syntax-directed derivations* (nice, because there are fewer) and *build non-syntax-directed derivations* (nice, because there are more).

As in the simply-typed $\lambda\text{-calculus,}$ we prove a straightforward value substitution lemma:

Lemma (Value substitution)

 $x:S, \Gamma \vdash t:T$ and $x \notin dom(\Gamma)$ and $\emptyset \vdash v:S$ imply $\Gamma \vdash [x \mapsto v]t:T$.

Here, the lemma is formulated in terms of the original presentation of the system.

By the way, this means that, if a term is well-typed, then so is its let-normal form. The converse is also true, and will be shown when we study type inference.

Subject reduction

To prove subject reduction, we assume that the syntax-directed presentation derives $\Gamma \vdash t : T$, we assume $t \longrightarrow t'$, and check that $\Gamma \vdash t' : T$ holds in the original presentation.

The proof is immediate:

- Case (β): deconstruct App and Abs, then apply the value substitution lemma;
- Case (let): deconstruct GenLet, then apply Gen and the value substitution lemma;
- Case (context): routine.

Progress is proved just as in the simply-typed λ -calculus, working on the syntax-directed presentation.

In summary, Type Substitution and Annihilation are the key properties that make the type system sound.

For further reading, see Wright and Felleisen [1994], Pierce [2002], Pottier and Rémy [2005].

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In the last course (December 18, 2007), we noted that the program:

```
let x = ref 3 in (x := 1; !x)
```

does not have the same semantics as its let-normal form:

ref 3; (ref 3) := 1; !(ref 3)

In the presence of effects, a term and its let-normal form do not have the same semantics, so the naïve approach to polymorphism, based on let-normal forms, (bac has no reason to be sound.

Damas and Milner's type system, which derives the same (monomorphic) typings as the naïve approach, has no reason to be sound either... In the last course, we also noted that type soundness strongly relies on the fact that every reference cell has a fixed type.

So, it is important to *rule out polymorphic references:* cells that admit multiple types at once. In short, a type of the form:

∀X.ref T

(where X appears in T) should never be inhabited. Right?

Right! Yet, if naïvely extended with references, Damas and Milner's type system allows constructing polymorphic references. This well-typed program, where x receives the type scheme

 $\forall X.ref(X \rightarrow X), goes wrong:$

let
$$x = ref(\lambda z.z)$$
 in $x := (\lambda z.z + 1)$; !x true

The cell x is written at type int \rightarrow int, then read at type bool \rightarrow bool.

We have proved type soundness for references without polymorphism, and for polymorphism without references, but *the combination fails*. Ah! Let's review the proof for references and polymorphism together. First, we augment typing judgements so that they take the form:

 $M, \Gamma \vdash t:S$

where M is a store typing, which maps memory locations to...

First, we augment typing judgements so that they take the form:

 $M, \Gamma \vdash t : S$

where M is a store typing, which maps memory locations to... types. No choice here: the syntax of types is T ::= ... | ref T, not T ::= ... | ref S, so the contents of a cell must have monomorphic type. This restriction is imposed by the design of ML. It is not required for soundness. In System F with references, a type of the form ref ($\forall X.T$) would be fine. The two novel rules of Damas and Milner's type system become:

$$\begin{array}{c} \text{Gen} \\ \underline{M, \Gamma \vdash t: T} \quad \bar{X} \ \# \ \Gamma \\ \hline M, \Gamma \vdash t: \forall \bar{X}. T \end{array} \end{array} \qquad \begin{array}{c} \text{Inst} \\ \underline{M, \Gamma \vdash t: \forall \bar{X}. T} \\ \hline M, \Gamma \vdash t: [\vec{X} \ \mapsto \vec{T}] T \end{array}$$

Right?

The two novel rules of Damas and Milner's type system become:

 $\frac{Gen}{M, \Gamma \vdash t: T \quad \bar{X} \# \Gamma} \qquad \qquad \frac{Inst}{M, \Gamma \vdash t: \forall \bar{X}.T} \\ \frac{M, \Gamma \vdash t: \forall \bar{X}.T}{M, \Gamma \vdash t: [\vec{X} \mapsto \vec{T}]T}$

Right?

No way! This version of Gen is broken. Because \bar{X} can appear in M, the Type Substitution lemma does not hold. So...

Clarifying the typing rules

The correct rule is, of course:

Mysterious slogan #1: one must not generalize a type variable that appears in the store typing. Aha!

This version satisfies Type Substitution.

Yet, the counter-example program shows that Subject Reduction is still broken... Where is the bug?

Nailing the bug

The problem lies in the (context) case of the Subject Reduction proof, and more specifically in the case of reduction under a universal introduction rule.

The hypotheses are:

 $\frac{M, \emptyset \vdash t: T \quad \bar{X} \# M}{M, \emptyset \vdash t: \forall \bar{X}. T} \quad \text{and} \quad \vdash \mu: M \quad \text{and} \quad t/\mu \longrightarrow t'/\mu'$

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$$M', \emptyset \vdash t' : T$$
 and $\vdash \mu' : M'$ and $M \subseteq M'$

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By the induction hypothesis, there exists M' such that:

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 and $\vdash \mu' : M'$ and $M \subseteq M'$

Here, we are stuck. We would like to build a new instance of Gen, but we are missing $\bar{X} \# M'$.

Mysterious slogan #2: one must not generalize a type variable that *might, after evaluation of the term,* enter the store typing. Aha! This is what happens in the counter-example:

let $x = ref(\lambda z.z : X \rightarrow X)$ in $x := (\lambda z.z + 1)$; !x true

The type variable X is generalized by GenLet. Yet, when ref $(\lambda z.z)$ reduces, $X \rightarrow X$ becomes the type of the newly allocated cell, so it appears in the new store typing.

This is all well and good, but how do we enforce slogan #2? Should we somehow restrict \bar{X} so as to ensure $\bar{X} \# M'$?

A number of rather complex historic approaches have been followed: see Leroy [1992] for a survey.

Then came Wright [1995], who suggested an amazingly simple solution, known as the *value restriction:* only values can be polymorphic.

$$\frac{Gen}{M, \Gamma \vdash v : T} \quad \overline{X \ \# \ M, \Gamma} \\ \frac{\overline{X \ \# \ M, \Gamma}}{M, \Gamma \vdash v : \forall \overline{X}.T}$$

The problematic proof case *vanishes:* we now never reduce under Gen. Subject Reduction holds again. The problematic program is now ill-typed:

let
$$x = ref(\lambda z.z)$$
 in $x := (\lambda z.z + 1)$; !x true

Indeed, ref $(\lambda z.z)$ is not a value, so Gen is not applicable. The variable x must receive a monotype, but none is suitable.

With the value restriction, some pure programs become ill-typed, even though they were well-typed in the absence of references. This style of introducing references in ML is *not a conservative extension*.

This definition cannot receive a polymorphic type scheme:

let
$$f = map \ id$$
 list $T \rightarrow \text{list } T$, for any type T

A common work-around is to perform a manual η -expansion:

let $f xs = map \ id xs$ $\forall X.list X \rightarrow list X$

In general, η -expansion is not semantics-preserving, so this must not be done blindly.

Experience has shown that the value restriction is tolerable. Even though it is not conservative, the search for better solutions has been pretty much abandoned.

Objective Caml implements Garrigue's relaxed value restriction [2004].

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