Objectif du cours
We cannot always rely on the existence of a competitive equilibrium. Alternative mechanisms have been (and are being) developed for a number of important allocation problems. This course will first discuss matching markets, which operate without a price adjusting to clear the market. Applications to be considered include assignment of students to schools and assignment of kidney donors to transplant patients. Second, this course will review selected results on auctions and discuss some applications.
A good understanding of microeconomic theory (as in Microeconomics L3 or similar). A good command of multivariate calculus is necessary.
Lecturer : Sinan Sarpca
Roth, A.E., Sotomayor, M.A. (1992) Two-Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. Econometric Society Monographs
Milgrom, Paul (2004) Putting Auction Theory to Work. Churchill Lectures, Cambridge University Press.